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A PROPERTY THEORY OF FUTURE EARNING
POTENTIAL IN DISSOLUTION PROCEEDINGS
State participation in domestic relations, particularly divorce, is a form
of societal protection. When the 5tate, through its courts or laws, estab-
lishes procedures for the dissolution of a marital community, society is
assured a necessary continuity. Although an individual family unit may
change, the laws governing divorce provide for preservation of the rights,
privileges, and duties of the family relationship. The state accomplishes
this first by allocating and establishing title to property of the marriage,
and second by providing for the ongoing support of those who had been
financially dependent upon the marital community.1
This comment begins by outlining state participation in the division of
marital property and in the allocation of support between husband and
wife. The focus then shifts to a discussion of future earning potential as a
possible asset subject to property division. Finally, the comment con-
cludes that future earning potential should be subject to community prop-
erty division.
I. PROPERTY DIVISION UPON DISSOLUTION
A. Community Property Theory
In Washington, property division is strongly influenced by community
property principles.2 "The fundamental premise of the community prop-
erty system is that both spouses contribute to property acquisitions in a
joint effort to promote the welfare of the relationship. ' 3 Because both
husband and wife contribute equally to the marital community, the prop-
erty acquired through these contributions should be divided equally upon
dissolution. Community property theory therefore recognizes the equal
co-ownership which inheres in each spouse by virtue of the marital rela-
tionship. 4
1. Children are the notable members of this latter class, but a discussion of child support theory is
beyond the scope of this comment. For a discussion of this and other implications of Washington
domestic law, see Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REV.
375 (1974).
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1979).
3. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REv. 729, 746 (1974),
citing Togliatti v. Robertson, 29 Wn. 2d 844, 852, 190 P.2d 575, 578 (1948).
4. Cross, supra note 3, at 733. Thus, under Washington law, an award of community property to
a spouse changes the form of the "tenancy" from community to separate, thus causing a segregation
or partition of the property. By contrast, under the principles of the common law, title to property
vested solely in the husband; consequently, an award of property to the wife created a legal interest
where there had been none.
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Washington law, however, does not require an equal division of prop-
erty upon dissolution, 5 nor does it limit division solely to community
property. 6 A dissolution court is given broad discretion to achieve a "just
and equitable" result. 7 This injection of equitable principles into the divi-
sion of property seems at first glance somewhat counter to the strict logic
of community property theory. It is, however, consistent with Washing-
ton's treatment of property distribution in dissolution actions.
B. Equitable Principles and Dissolution
State involvement in dissolution protects both the parties and society.
The law recognizes that society's best interests are served by the exercise
of equitable judicial powers to attain post-dissolution fairness between the
parties. 8 This balancing of equities may occur either through a property
division or through an award of spousal support (alimony).
An award of alimony was traditionally "an allowance in a divorce ac-
tion to the wife from the husband for her support, in lieu of the legal
obligation of the husband to support her.' 9 At present, however, this pa-
triarchal view of alimony is less persuasive because of the expanding role
of women in society and in the work force; notions such as the husband's
"obligation" have become anachronistic. ' 0 In addition, the exclusion of
husbands from receipt of alimony has been held unconstitutional. 1' Con-
sequently, alimony has become less a judicial enforcement of a legal
duty, and more a means of providing support during the period of transi-
tion from a married to a single status.
An award of property, however, may serve this same equalizing func-
tion, since in Washington all the assets of the parties are available for
distribution. 12 Moreover, as the comparison below illustrates, the use of
property as a means for redistribution has attributes unavailable with con-
ventional alimony:
5. In re Marriage of Donovan, 25 Wn. App. 691, 696, 612 P.2d 387, 389-90 (1980).
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1979).
7. Id.
8. See Erickson v. Erickson, 30 Wn. 2d 914, 918, 194 P.2d 954, 956 (1948) (describing histori-
cal bases for equitable powers of divorce court); In re Marriage of Nicholson, 17 Wn. App. 110,
115-19, 561 P.2d 1116, 1119-27 (1977) (court's equitable powers are not affected by new dissolu-
tion act).
9. Valaerv. Valaer, 45 Wn. 2d 565,570,277 P.2d 326,329(1954).
10. See generally Freeman, Should Spousal Support be Abolished?, 48 L.A.B. BULL. 236
(1973).
11. Orr v.Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1979). See also In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d 649,
565 P.2d 790 (1977); In re Marriage of Dalthorp, 23 Wn. App. 904, 598 P.2d 788 (1979). Washing-
ton courts also have the power to make unequal awards of property.
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ALIMONY AWARD . PROPERTY DIVISION
Generally ends with either the Survives death of either party.14
obligor's or recipient's
death. 13
Is subject to modification. 15  Is generally not modifiable. 16
Is predicated upon the need of Is the recognition of an owner-
the recipient and the ability of ship right, and need not be
the obligor.17  keyed to financial resources. 18
Is a tax deduction to the obligor Is neither a deduction nor in-
and taxable income to the re- come. 20
cipient. 19
Property division provides more stability in distribution than does ali-
mony. The task remains, however, of determining the existence of mari-
tal property. A truly equitable result may be obtained only if in fact all the
property-real and personal, tangible and intangible-is available to the
court for distribution. 21
13. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.170 (1979); Bird v. Henke, 65 Wn. 2d 79, 395 P.2d 751 (1964);
Sutliffv. Harstad, 5 Wn. App. 539,488 P.2d 288 (1971).
14. See generally Cross, supra note 3.
15. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.170 (1979); Thompson v. Thompson, 82 Wn. 2d 352, 510 P.2d
827 (1973).
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (1979). See generally Rieke, supra note 1, at 405-06.
17. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.090 (1979). See also Kelso v. Kelso, 75 Wn. 2d 24, 448 P.2d
499 (1968).
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1979). See also Cross, supra note 3, at 818-19.
19. I.R.C. § 215(a); I.R.C. § 71(a) (1).
20. McCombs v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1968).
21. Washington's preference for using property division instead of alimony for purposes of ad-
justing the equities affects the use of alimony in dissolution. In Washington, permanent alimony is
neither favored nor a matter of right. Berg v. Berg, 72 Wn. 2d 532, 434 P.2d 1 (1967); Mose v.
Mose, 4 Wn. App. 204, 480 P.2d 517 (1971). Additionally, its award is governed by the financial
need of the recipient and the ability of the payor to make the payments. In re Marriage of Hadley, 88
Wn. 2d 649, 674-76, 565 P.2d 790, 803-04 (1977) (Horowitz, J., dissenting); Friedlander v. Fried-
lander, 80 Wn. 2d 293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972); Morgan v. Morgan, 59 Wn. 2d 639, 369 P.2d 516
(1962). By contrast, California-also operating within a community property system-has chosen to
utilize alimony rather than property division as a vehicle for equitable adjustment. Comment, Cali-
fornia Divorce Reform: Its Effect on Community Property Awards, I PAC. L. J. 310, 316-17, 320
(1970). California's preference is dictated by the statutory requirement that community property be
divided equally. CAL. Crv. CODE ANN. § 4800(a), (b) (1)-(2) (1970). Consequently, alimony is
treated more favorably in California than it is in Washington. Compare In re Marriage of Aufmuth,
89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979) (no abuse of discretion for trial court to retain
jurisdiction over amount of spousal support) and In re Marriage of Rosan, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 101
Cal. Rptr. 295 (1972) (statute did not relieve husband of any continuing obligation to provide spousal
support) with Berg v. Berg, 72 Wn. 2d 352, 434 P.2d 1 (1967) (not the policy of the law to place
permanent responsibility on divorced spouse to support other indefinitely) and Mose v. Mose, 4 Wn.
App. 204, 480 P.2d 517 (1971) (permanent alimony disfavored). Compare also Friedlander v. Fried-
lander, 80 Wn. 2d 293, 297, 494 P.2d 208, 211 (1972) (lifestyle acquired during marriage not a
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II. CURRENT TRENDS IN PROPERTY THEORY
Recent legal developments have indicated a judicial willingness to
break new ground in achieving equitable results in dissolution actions.
Over the last twenty years, the concept of property has undergone signifi-
cant change. 22 For example, courts have treated pension rights,2 3 per-
sonal goodwill in a business or profession,24 and increased earning capac-
ity from education 25 as property that may be valued and divided upon
dissolution. This has been done even though such assets do not have ex-
change or market value, and often cannot be assigned; sold, transferred,
conveyed or pledged. The courts have proceeded upon the theory that
failure to treat such assets as divisible property would be inequitable; 26
consequently, courts have been willing to stretch conventional theories of
property in order to achieve justice between the parties.
The basis for a general theory of future earning potential as an asset
may be found in an examination of dissolution cases which have divided
the value of an education or individual goodwill between the parties.
A. Goodwill
Goodwill has been defined as "property of an intangible nature ..
measure of need) with In re Marriage of Rosan, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 897, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295, 304
(1972) (accustomed standard of living may indicate need). See also criteria for maintenance listed in
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.090 (1979).
22. An analogous theoretical progression may be seen in the area of law involving assignability
of future contract rights. At one time, such assignments were considered void because they attempted
to assign that which was not property. See, e.g., 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 874 (1951). Presently,
however, future rights are assignable to the extent that they arise out of an existing or continuing
employment or relationship. Assignment of rights under a contract not yet in existence operates only
as a promise to assign when the rights arise. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1967).
The limitation on an assignment of future contract rights is imposed "not because of any logical
necessity, but by virtue of a public policy which seeks to protect the assignor and third parties against
transfers which may be improvident or fraudulent." Id., comment (b), at 187 (emphasis added). See
also 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 413 (3d ed. 1960). Thus, to the extent that treatment of future
earning potential as a property right involves assignment of future contract rights, the concerns ex-
pressed by the Restatement do not apply. The only applicable public policy is the public's interest in
equitable dissolutions of marriage. See notes 58-63 and accompanying text infra.
23. See, e.g., Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wn. 2d 354, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975). See generally Annot., 94
A.L.R. 3d 176 (1979).
24. Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956); In re Marriage of Fleege, 91
Wn. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979); In re Marriage of Campbell, 22 Wn. App. 560, 589 P.2d 1244
(1979); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481,558 P.2d 279 (1976).
25. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d
266 (Ky. App. 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175
N.J. Super. 443,419 A.2d 1149 (1980).
26. See, e.g.. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W. 2d 266 (Ky. App. 1979); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16
Wn. App. 481,486,558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976).
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the expectation of continued public patronage. "27 It was originally held
only to exist in commercial or trade enterprises. 28 More recently, several
community property and common law states have used expanded prop-
erty theories to find that goodwill is also an asset of an individual,29 and
commentators in other states are urging the adoption of this approach. 30
Thus far, individual goodwill has been found to exist only in those per-
sons with professional careers. 31
The courts which have addressed the individual goodwill issue stress
that a person in a profession or business has usually obtained something
quite valuable. The professional individual's skill, training, and reputa-
tion create a reasonable expectation of future profit. This expectation is an
asset which has been denominated goodwill, and it exists despite its lack
of salability or transferability. 32
Once it is recognized as property, goodwill becomes an asset for which
an accounting can be made in a dissolution action.33 In doing so, courts
will look closely at the ongoing value to the person retaining the business
or practice, and the corresponding loss in value to their spouse. 34
In several cases involving individual goodwill, the nonprofessional
spouse is analogized to a "silent partner" who is forced to withdraw from
the partnership. 35 Thus, an award of goodwill to the nonprofessional
27. In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481, 483, 558 P.2d 279, 280 (1976). See also In re
Giant's Estate, 57 Wn. 2d 309, 356 P.2d 707 (1960); In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577,
582, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (1974).
28. In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481,484, 558 P.2d 279, 281 (1976). Goodwill was
often discussed in cases involving contracts not to compete after the sale of a business. Cowan v.
Fairbrother, 118 N.C. 406, 24 S.E. 212 (1898).
29. Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1962) (attorney); Stem v.
Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975) (attorney); Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185
N.E.2d 773 (1961) (characterized the right to practice medicine as a "franchise"); In re Marriage
of Coger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976) (dentist); In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wn. 2d 324,
588 P.2d 1136 (1979) (dentist); In re Marriage of Campbell, 22 Wn. App. 560, 589 P.2d 1244
(1979) (manufacturer's representative); In re Marriage of Kaplan, 23 Wn. App. 503, 597 P.2d 439
(1979) (attorney); In re Marriage of Freedman, 23 Wn. App. 27,592 P.2d 1124 (1979) (attorney); In
re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976) (osteopath). But cf. Nail v. Nail, 486
S.W.2d 761 (Texas 1972) (no divisible property value in professional goodwill). For an analysis of
the Nail result, see Note, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 222 (1979).
30. See, e.g., Adams, Professional Goodwill as Community Property: How Should Idaho
Rule?, 14 IDAHO L. Rav. 473 (1978).
31. See cases cited supra notes 24 & 29.
32. See, e.j., In re Mafriage of Campbell, 22 Wn. App. 560, 564, 589 P.2d 1244, 1247 (1979);
In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481, 484, 558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976).
33. In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481,486,558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976).
34. In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wn. 2d 324, 327-30, 588 P.2d 1136, 1138-39 (1979); In re
Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481,487, 558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976).
35. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 108, 107, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (1974); Todd v.
Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969); Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App.
2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110 (1962).
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spouse is akin to an actual sale, in that the professional is "buying -out"
the spouse's community interest. 36
The court in a dissolution action involving a professional is faced with
three questions of fact. First, it must determine whether professional
goodwill exists. 37 Second, the court must ascertain the worth of the
goodwill to the individual possessing it, calculated as of the date of the
dissolution of the marriage. 38 Third, the court must find the extent to
which it is community property. 39 Once these issues are resolved, the
goodwill is available as an asset, and may be distributed between the par-
ties. The crucial point, however, is not the means by which goodwill is
valued, but that a property interest is found in an intangible.
B. Educational Attainments
Several cases have held that an educational degree is a divisible asset.
These cases are based on theories similar to those developed in the
goodwill cases. Typically, one spouse attains a degree while the other
provides support; then a divorce occurs soon after graduation. Usually
there are few assets immediately available,40 but one spouse leaves the
36.. Golden v. Golden, 27 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735, 738 (1969) (wife's share analo-
gized to increase in stock value); Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106,
110 (1962) (wife suffering "enforced retirement"). It should be noted that the recognition of profes-
sional goodwill has been criticized. See, e.g., Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Texas 1972); In re
Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wn. 2d 324, 330-36, 588 P.2d 1136, 1140-43 (1979) (Stafford, J., dissent-
ing).
37. In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481,486, 558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976).
38. In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wn. 2d 324, 327, 588 P.2d 1136, 1140 (1979). In essence, the
existence of individual, professional goodwill is derived from its continuing value to the person pos-
sessing it. Id. at 326-30, 588 P.2d at 1138-40. Factors used in the determination and valuation of
such goodwill include the "practitioner's age, health, past earning power, reputation in the commu-
nity for judgment, skill and knowledge, and his comparative professional success." Id. at 326, 588
P.2d at 1138. See generally Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. REv.
157, 166 (1978). While these criteria are often used, however, there remains no set method for deter-
mining goodwill value. See generally Adams, supra note 30; In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App.
481, 486, 588 P.2d 279, 282 (1976); Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90, 95-96
(1956).
39. In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 583, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 53 (1974); In re
Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 388, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (1973); In re Marriage of
Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481,486, 558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976).
40. While it is true that these decision have involved dissolutions with little tangible property to
divide, see, e.g.. In re Marriage of Hortsmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 886-88 (Iowa 1978); Inman v.
Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269-70 (Ky. App. 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 751-52
(Okla. 1979), this fact need not detract from the underlying proposition that equity could be served
only by a division of the education as an asset of the marriage. The property value of an education is
perhaps more readily apparent when there is no other property involved, but the context in which an
asset is found should not alter its legal status. The education cases present persuasive arguments for
holding education to be a property right, regardless of the presence of other assets in a particular case.
See cases cited supra note 25 and infra note 46.
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marriage with an education and increased earning potential, while the
other spouse is given nothing for her efforts. 41
The Iowa Supreme Court was the first to hold that, under such a fact
pattern, the degree obtained by the educated spouse could be valued and
divided upon dissolution. 42 The court reasoned that the supporting spouse
was a partner in the other's education, and as such was entitled to a share
of the resulting proceeds. The court recognized that the supporting spouse
had likely foregone or postponed opportunities for a separate career, 43
and was therefore less likely to be capable of immediate self-support.
Furthermore, the supporting spouse was not going to "reap the future
benefits of these sacrifices in a way of increased income and a satisfying
lifestyle." 44 Finally, the court noted that the educated spouse had re-
ceived a "windfall" in the form of increased earning capacity. This
windfall was the direct result of the unrewarded efforts of the supporting
spouse. 45 This holding has been followed in several jurisdictions, with
similar rationales being employed. 46
The courts which have treated an educational degree as a divisible asset
agree that the supporting spouse should be compensated for her ef-
forts. In reaching this conclusion, courts have utilized a variety of theo-
ries, such as unjust enrichment, restitution, or "return on investment. "47
41. See generally Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10
CALIF. L. REv. 590 (1974); Note, Divorce after Professional School: Education and Future Earning
Capacity May Be Marital Property, 44 Mo. L. REv. 329, 334 (1979).
42. In re Marriage of Hortsmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
43. Id. at 887-91. See Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266,268-69 (Ky. App. 1979).
44. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Iowa 1978).
45. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Iowa 1978) ("[I]t is the potential for
increase in future earning capacity... which constitutes the asset for distribution by the court."). See
also Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. App. 1979); Cf. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d
747, 751 (Okla. 1979) (return on investment theory); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Okla.
App. 1975) ("Although the award of money is termed 'permanent alimony,' it is in substance a
property award for the contributions which plaintiff made to defendant's increase in earning capac-
ity.").
46. See cases cited supra note 25. New Jersey, Colorado, and California have rejected the notion
that education can constitute a divisible asset: Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975) (but
see Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 419 A.2d 1149 (1980)); In re Marriage of Graham,
194 Colo. 472, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134
(1969) (Education is "manifestly .. .of such a nature that a monetary value .. .cannot be
placed upon it."); In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979)
(rejecting Horstmann analysis on grounds that division of education would involve future earnings,
and thus violate community property principles).
Although Washington has not spoken directly on the subject, the reasoning of the cases holding
education acquired during marriage to be a divisible asset would seemingly fit with the domestic law
of this state. Cf. Childers v. Childers, 15 Wn. App. 792, 552 P.2d 83 (1976) (upholding trial court
requirement that husband pay for wife's post-dissolution education), rev'd on other grounds, 89 Wn.
2d 592,575 P.2d 201 (1978).
47. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (unjust enrichment); Inman v.
Washington Law Review
Again, as in the goodwill cases, the particular theory used is not as mean-
ingful as the fact that the court found a property interest in something
intangible and speculative.
III. FUTURE EARNING POTENTIAL
A. Need for Recognition as an Asset
Presently, persons who divorce professional spouses can, in Washing-
ton and other states, reasonably expect to be compensated for their share
of the future value of a presently owned asset (i.e., the professional's
potential for future earnings). This result may be achieved through a divi-
sion of professional goodwill or professional education. 48 Individuals in-
volved in dissolutions with nonprofessional spouses, however, are left to
alimony or traditional property division to protect their interests, neither
of which may be adequate. 49 In such cases, equality of treatment requires
that the future earning potential of the nonprofessional spouse be ascer-
tained and divided. 50 Unlike the goodwill and education cases, a general
property theory of future earning potential would not be limited to busi-
ness and professional persons. It would apply whenever the efforts of one
spouse contributed to the earning potential of the other.
B. Basis for Recognition as an Asset: The Goodwill and Education
Cases as Precedent
The goodwill and education decisions base their allocation of intangi-
ble property upon the contributions made to the marriage by the non-
professional or supporting spouse. Similar contributions exist in any mar-
riage where one spouse achieves a degree of economic success through
the other's support, whether that support is monetary or moral. In such a
Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. App. 1979) (restitution); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla.
1979) (return on investment). The court in Horstmann, while stating that it was going to consider
potential earning capacity, in fact based the award to the wife on a restitution theory. See Note, supra
note 41, at 336-38.
48. See cases cited supra notes 24 & 25.
49. See notes 13-21 and accompanying text supra.
50. To illustrate: Assume that couple A and couple B are obtaining dissolutions at the same time.
The husband in couple A is a doctor in private practice, while the husband in couple B is a corporate
executive; neither wife works outside the home. Other than the different careers of the husbands, both
couples have substantially the same income, and have approximately the same amount of tangible
property. Assuming that the property of each marriage is divided equally between the spouses at
dissolution, the wife in couple A will receive more in a property division than her counterpart in
couple B. This is because divisible goodwill will exist in the medical practice of A. In short, regard-
less of the amount allocated to the wife in B, under current Washington law she stands to receive less
than the wife in A because there is less total property available to her.
284
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case, the supporting spouse is entitled to share in the assets obtained
with her help, including the asset of future earning potential. Applying a
theory invoked in the goodwill and education cases, the supporting
spouse can be viewed as "investing" in the wage earner.51 Similarly, the
wage earner would be unjustly enriched if no recompense is made to the
supporting spouse for her efforts on the wage earner's behalf.52
As a practical matter, the fact that a general theory of future earning
potential would encompass both professionals and nonprofessionals is of
no significance. Determination of the existence of nonprofessional earn-
ing capacity would require no more speculation than professional earning
capacity. Testimony could be taken regarding the likelihood of continued
employment, and availability of similar positions. Essentially, the inquiry
would be very similar to that made in a professional goodwill case.53
As a theoretical matter, however, the significance of the profes-
sional/nonprofessional distinction is more troublesome. This is because
goodwill is a recognized property concept, and is now readily adapted to
the professional person. Likewise, division of educational achievements
is gaining in acceptability. Yet, this has not always been the case. Both
property concepts were developed by courts desiring to divide marital as-
sets in a fair manner.54 In so doing, they applied existing theories, 55 but
the final result was that property was found where it had not been before.
The equitable considerations that prompted the expansion of property
concepts to include education and individual goodwill can be equally ap-
plied to a theory of future earning potential as property.
51. See, e.g., Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110 (1962);
Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496, 501 (1974).
52. One court has stated that its division of property included future income potential, but the
party whose future capacity was allocated was a professional. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263
N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
53. See In re Marriage of Campbell, 22 Wn. App. 560, 563-64, 589 P.2d 1244, 1247 (1979).
See also notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra for an enumeration of the factors used in deter-
mining the value of professional goodwill. Additional support for the recognition of future earning
potential as property is found in tort law. In both wrongful death and personal injury actions, courts
have allowed the plaintiffs to recover for loss of capacity, measured by their potential for future
income, even though such amounts are by necessity conjectural. Both Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d
226, 269 (Ky. App. 1979) and In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75, 79 (1978)
(Carrigan, J., dissenting), utilize this point. See also Note, supra note 41, at 334-35.
54. See generally Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108-10
(1962).
55. Such theories include goodwill, restitution, and return on investment. See notes 36-38,
44-47 and accompanying text supra. The power of the courts to mold theories to ensure justice is
well recognized. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Donovan, 25 Wn. App. 691, 696, 612 P.2d 387,
389-90 (1980). Cf. Witzel v. Tena, 48 Wn. 2d 628, 631-33,295 P.2d 1115, 1117-18 (1956) (parti-
tion action: once equity jurisdiction of the court is invoked, it has power to adjust the equities, even to
the extent of divesting one party of his one-half interest in the property).
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C. Potential Objections to Recognition as an Asset
Objections to the consideration of future earning potential as property
take two notable approaches. 56 First, that it does not fit into traditional
community property theory;57 second, that it is too vague to be consid-
ered property. 58
The argument that a theory of future earning potential as property could
not be justified under community property law is predicated on the as-
sumption that a lien would have to be imposed on the future earnings of
the wage earner, in order for the spouse to collect on the "invest-
ment. 59 Were this the case, there would perhaps be difficulties in recon-
ciling the practice to community property principles, since a lien would
necessarily involve income obtained after the dissolution and would
therefore be separate property. 60
As in the goodwill cases, however, the future earnings per se would not
be divided. The subject of the division would be the potential; the sup-
porting spouse would receive a share proportionate to contributions made
during the marriage. In this way, future earning potential is analogous to
a pension or retirement right. It is well established that pension rights may
be divided in a dissolution action, even though they are unvested and not
presently possessory. 61 The division is based upon the percentage of the
pension acquired during the existence of a marital community. 62 Division
of future earning potential could be treated in a similar manner; to the
extent the potential is acquired during marriage, it is divisible as a com-
munity asset.
The second argument, that future earning potential is not property, is
56. Additionally, arguments are based on the sufficiency of existing remedies. See notes 13-21
and accompanying text supra.
57. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678
(1979); In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 388, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (1973).
58. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978).
59. See In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 388, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (1973)
(footnote omitted), where the court stated: "Since the philosophy of the community property system
is that a community interest can be acquired only during the time of the marriage, it would then be
inconsistent with that philosophy to assign to any community interest the value of the post-marital
efforts of either spouse." See also In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 668, 677-78 (1979). This interpretation of community property law may not be applicable in
Washington. See note 21 supra.
60. It should be noted, however, that community property principles are not always followed
precisely. For example, a basic tenet is the undivided co-ownership by husband and wife, yet, Wash-
ington courts are empowered to divide the community property unequally if necessary to achieve
equitable results. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Donovan, 25 Wn. App. 691, 695-96, 612 P.2d 387,
389-90 (1980); Rehak v. Rehak, I Wn. App. 963, 966-67,465 P.2d 687, 689-90 (1970).
61. Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wn. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975).
62. See id. at 369, 534 P.2d at 1358.
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predicated upon the notion that there are certain attributes which are the
sine qua non of property. 63 The validity of this argument, however, is
questionable in a state which recognizes either goodwill or education as
divisible assets. Both the goodwill and education cases involve property
that is scarcely conventional, yet the lack of the traditional earmarks of
property has not obscured evidence that valuable interests exist.64 The
valuation of future earning potential would be no more conceptually diffi-
cult than valuation of the goodwill of an osteopath, 65 or a dental educa-
tion.66
IV. APPLICATION OF THE THEORY IN WASHINGTON
Even though Washington allows unequal property division, this alone
may be inadequate if future earning potential is not considered. 67 The
Washington Supreme Court has recommended limits on property divi-
sion, 68 which have generally been followed.69 Moreover, traditional
property division does nothing for the spouse in a no-asset divorce if the
other spouse is not a professional; 70 even if tangible assets exist, the
spouse of a nonprofessional comes away with less than the spouse of a
professional. 71
The recognition of future earning capacity as a divisible marital asset
would enable courts to devise equitable property distributions in all disso-
lutions, not just those involving professional persons. Washington has al-
ready recognized that the division of property need not be strictly equal to
be equitable, 72 and has found the existence of goodwill value in an indi-
63. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978), where the
court considered property to be that which could be "assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or
pledged."
64. See generally Comment, supra note 41, at 590-602; Note, supra note 41, at 331-35. Cali-
fornia, which has recognized professional goodwill as an asset, has rejected the notion that education
can have divisible value. See In re Marriage of Aufrnuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 460-61, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 668, 677 (1979); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134-35 (1969).
65. See In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976).
66. See Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. App. 1979).
67. This is due to the fact that while future earning potential may be considered in awarding
alimony, such treatment is unsatisfactory given Washington's negative view toward permanent sup-
port awards. See notes 12-21 and accompanying text supra.
68. Wills v. Wills, 50 Wn. 2d 439, 441, 312 P.2d 661, 662 (1957) (community property should
be divided in no greater ratio than 1/3 to 2/3).
69. Rehak v. Rehak, I Wn. App. 963, 966-67, 465 P.2d 687, 689-90 (1970) (stating general
rule, but allowing for exceptions based on equitable or statutory considerations).
70. But see cases cited note 25 supra, which allowed a division of an educational degree where
no other assets existed.
71. See note 50 supra.
72. See, e.g., Rehak v. Rehak, 1 Wn. App. 963,465 P.2d 687(1970).
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vidual; 73 courts in other jurisdictions have found property interests in edu-
cation. 74 While these advancements are commendable, they still do not
adequately protect spouses in dissolutions involving a nonprofessional.
This protection may be provided by characterizing, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, future earning potential as a divisible asset.
V. CONCLUSION
Given Washington's preference for "equity through property," and
the deficiences of alimony, 75 the treatment of future earning potential as
property is a desirable and practical next step in the evolution of property
law. A perpetual lien upon the wage earner's future earnings is not advo-
cated, nor should there be a division of the future income as such. Rather,
the future earning potential of the income producing spouse ought to have
a value placed upon it as of the date of dissolution. This value should then
be included in the property available for distribution. Aside from the ter-
minology employed, this is little different than what is already being done
in Washington with professional goodwill and pension rights, or that
done in other states with education. In this way, the investments made by
all spouses in their partner's career would be recompensed, thus arriving
at a "just and equitable" 76 result.
Jon Andrew Chandler
73. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481, 486, 558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976).
74. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman, 578
S.W.2d 266 (Ky. App. 1979); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 419 A.2d 1149 (1980);
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
75. See note 21 supra.
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1979).
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